In the management and business ethics literatures, stakeholder engagement has been demonstrated to lead to more ethical management practices. However, there may be limits on the extent to which stakeholder engagement can, as currently conceptualized, resolve some of the more difficult ethical challenges faced by managers. In this paper we argue that stakeholder engagement, when seen as a way of reducing five types of knowledge problems—risk, ambiguity, complexity, equivocality, and a priori irreducible uncertainty—can aid managers in resolving such ethical challenges. (...) Using a practical illustration of the ethical challenges surrounding the development and application of genetic modification technologies, we demonstrate how stakeholder engagement enables managers to better address these knowledge problems, thereby to manage more ethically. In this way, we suggest that stakeholder engagement has an even more crucial role to play in business ethics research and practice. (shrink)

Teaching ethics poses a dilemma for professors of business. First, they have little or no formal training in ethics. Second, they have established ethical values that they may not want to impose upon their students. What is needed is a well-recognized, yet non-sectarian model to facilitate the clarification of ethical questions. Gestalt theory offers such a framework. Four Gestalt principles facilitate ethical clarification and another four Gestalt principles anesthetize ethical clarification. This article examines each principle, illustrates that principle through current (...) business examples, and offers exercises for developing each principle. (shrink)

The concept of evolvability—the capacity of a population to produce and maintain evolutionarily relevant variation—has become increasingly prominent in evolutionary biology. Paleontology has a long history of investigating questions of evolvability, but paleontological thinking has tended to neglect recent discussions, because many tools used in the current evolvability literature are challenging to apply to the fossil record. The fundamental difficulty is how to disentangle whether the causes of evolutionary patterns arise from variational properties of traits or lineages rather than being (...) due to selection and ecological success. Despite these obstacles, the fossil record offers unique and growing sources of data that capture evolutionary patterns of sustained duration and significance otherwise inaccessible to evolutionary biologists. Additionally, there exist a variety of strategic possibilities for combining prominent neontological approaches to evolvability with those from paleontology. We illustrate three of these possibilities with quantitative genetics, evolutionary developmental biology, and phylogenetic models of macroevolution. In conclusion, we provide a methodological schema that focuses on the conceptualization, measurement, and testing of hypotheses to motivate and provide guidance for future empirical and theoretical studies of evolvability in the fossil record. (shrink)

Rapid handwriting, popularly known as shorthand, involves writing symbols and abbreviations in lieu of common words or phrases. This method increases the speed of transcription and is primarily used to record oral dictation. Someone skilled in shorthand will be able to write as fast as the dictation occurs, and these patterns are later transliterated into actual, natural language words. A new kind of rapid handwriting scheme is proposed, called the Pattern-Based Shorthand. A word on a keyboard involves pressing a unique (...) sequence of keys in a particular order. This sequence forms a pattern that defines the word. Such a pattern forms the shorthand for that word. Speech recognition involves identifying, by a machine, the words spoken by a speaker. These spoken words form speech input signals to a computer that is equipped to correctly recognize the words and do further action, such as convert it to text. From this text input, unique shorthand patterns are generated by the system. The system employs machine learning to improve its performance with experience, by creating a dictionary of mappings from word to patterns in such a way that the access to existing patterns is faster with progression. This forms a new knowledge representation schema that reduces the redundancy in the storage of words and the length of information content. In conclusion, the speech is converted into textual form and then reconstructed into Pattern-Based Shorthand. (shrink)

This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself is (...) sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A book which attempts to introduce the reader to current problems in the philosophy of science, and at the same time to provide a new and significant treatment of some of these problems. The "modest empiricism" which Scheffler has espoused in a number of previous publications is given a detailed presentation in a study of historical attempts to provide meaning for three crucial concepts in the field: explanation, signification and confirmation.--R. H. K.

The debate between hard and soft determinists is dealt with in this brief but interesting study. The author argues that there is no empirical dispute between hard and soft determinists. They draw different conclusions from the observed facts and these differences are the result of using different senses of the terms 'freedom' and 'moral responsibility'. Moritz Schlick's Problems of Ethics is the author's favored source for the soft determinist position and well-known articles by Paul Edwards and John Hospers the sources (...) for hard determinism. Other writers are quoted and briefly discussed. The treatment of many criticisms and countercriticisms is all too brief to do full justice to all the issues involved, but those topics which the author discusses are often illuminated. Interesting things are said about such topics as kleptomania, post-hypnotic suggestion, punishment, and excusable behavior. The book makes a convincing case, at least for the claim that a sophisticated version of the hard determinist position, such as appears in Hospers article, is only verbally different than many versions of soft determinism. Other versions of hard and soft determinism can and do come in substantive conflict with one another.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Originally published as a long essay in Mind and Cosmos, Volume II of the University of Pittsburgh series in the philosophy of science, this study admirably fills the need for an elementary survey of problems in the area of probability and induction. But it is more than an introduction. The author is working on the general thesis that Bayes' theorem of the probability calculus holds the key to the understanding of scientific inference. Guided by this idea he attempts to salvage (...) what he thinks is of value in various current theories of probability and scientific inference, particularly, the frequency theory of probability as defended by Reichenbach, Popper's views on the falsifiability of theories, and Hanson's work on the logic of discovery. These attempts to develop a theory in the latter part of the book follow discussions of Hume's critique of induction, the probability calculus and five past and present interpretations of the calculus. This is a well-written and challenging introduction to the field.—R. H. K. (shrink)

In spite of the title, the author of this book asserts that its primary aim is to offer a reasonable account of the concepts of possibility and potentiality. His analysis of these concepts allows him to approach the free will controversy in his own way and to offer many interesting analyses and arguments bearing on the issue. He distinguishes three kinds of non-logical possibility: epistemic or relative possibility, natural possibility or natural power, and possibility of choice or personal power. He (...) thinks that the arguments for determinism have been based in one way or another on a failure to notice the subtle differences which exist between these three kinds of non-logical possibility. Although there is room for doubt that his analysis adds up to a decisive refutation of determinism, he has found many interesting differences between kinds of possibility and potentiality which bear on the free will issue and other philosophical issues as well. There is a discernible influence of Ryle and Austin on the book although both of these philosophers come in for criticism, especially Ryle for his failure to carefully separate the different meanings of 'power', 'tendency', 'capacity', and similar terms, and for his general commitment to the notion that all power is conditional. This latter thesis is one of the author's main targets.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this book the author develops his own systems of and semantics for presupposition free logic. He calls his systems logics without existence assumptions, by which he means logical systems which are sound and complete with respect to a semantic theory in which a universe of discourse can be empty but any term which denotes must denote something in the universe, all predicates including identity represent relations holding among members of the universe and the quantifiers range over just all the (...) members of the universe. In a brief introductory chapter the author reviews the motivations for constructing non-standard logics of this kind and briefly discusses what he takes to be the limitations of previous work done in the field. Persons interested in the philosophical problems and uses of such logics are likely to find this chapter interesting though disappointingly brief. Four of the eight chapters are devoted to the development of a natural deduction system N which is a logic without existence assumptions in the author's sense. The system N is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the author's semantics. An axiomatic system L is later developed and shown to be equivalent to N. The final chapter is devoted to discussing the relation of his work to many-valued logics, modal logics, intuitionistic logic and the theory of classes among other topics. The author believes that logics without existence assumptions "will in the long run displace the less natural and more narrow standard logics."--R. H. K. (shrink)

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)

When in 1950, the distinguished psychologist, Jean Piaget, published a book on the relation of logic and psychology, the book was severely criticized in the journal Methodos by the logician E. V. Beth. Piaget asked to get together with Beth to discuss the issues involved. The result, over 15 years later, is the present book. Beth is the author of the first half in which he defends the complete autonomy of logic in relation to psychology by means of a partly (...) philosophical, partly historical treatment of logicist, formalist, and intuitionist philosophies of mathematics. Briefly put, Beth's thesis is the now familiar one in contemporary philosophy that logic and mathematics are normative sciences, psychology is a factual science. As a consequence, Beth argues that we must renounce all "psychologism" in logic and mathematics, and all "logicism" in psychology. Piaget has come to accept these main contentions of Beth and affirms them in the second half of the volume. But Piaget is impressed by the fact that a good deal of human conceptual development must go on before human beings recognize and state normative laws of logical thought. Piaget attempts to chart this conceptual development and explain how it takes place. He attempts to show that this genetic-psychological approach to the study of logical and mathematical thought is complementary to and fully compatible with the deductive approach of the formal logician, and hence compatible with Beth's thesis about the conceptual autonomy of logic and psychology. Logician and psychologist can thus deal with the same material although their approaches are conceptually autonomous. The book repays careful reading not only for the arguments defending these challenging claims but also for many other details in both parts.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The translator has collected passages from the varied corpus of Schweitzer's writing and has pieced them together into a brief but impressive sketch of the man and the thinker. Some sections are autobiographical; others contain Schweitzer's thoughts on Africa, world peace, on Goethe and Bach among historical figures, and a few of his basic philosophical ideas. An index provides references to the original works.--R. H. K.

Two fundamental theses of sensationalism as a theory of science, formulated by Mach and influential since his time, are critically treated in this analytic study. The first is that the basic elements of experience are sensations, the second that scientific explanation is no more than a complete description of phenomena in terms of sensations. In arguing against these claims the author touches on many important issues in the philosophy of science, including questions about the nature of description and explanation. He (...) argues against the view that there are no pure descriptions, in the sense of descriptions which are free of interpretation.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A painstaking examination of theories of good and right in twentieth century British thought leads the author back to Kant, whose views are in turn exposed and criticized. Out of these investigations is developed a theory of good in terms of the dignity of man, which will account for the Kantian ideas of obligation and autonomy, yet give material content to ethical judgments. The concluding thesis is a challenge that an ultimate choice is required between the book's humanitarian view of (...) morality and maximalist views. No compromise is possible. The arguments are clear, cogent, and provocative. --R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a careful analytical study of some of the central concepts of contemporary political thought. In separate chapters the author deals with the concepts of liberty, loyalty, power, and tolerance, exposing in the process some of the contradictions and confusions of contemporary American liberal and conservative thought. In the first chapter, which takes its point of departure from J. S. Mill's writings on liberty and political economy, Wolff shows that conservatives and liberals in the U.S. often share common principles (...) but disagree over the relevant facts. Since he thinks liberals have usually been right about the facts they have come, in his opinion, to dominate political debates. But the principles themselves need questioning, according to Wolff, and he formulates his own alternative in a final chapter entitled "Community." His aim in this final chapter is to rehabilitate the notion of the general or public good as distinct from the sum of the private goods of individuals, without falling into the totalitarian mold of various theories of the general good during the past few centuries. His ideas are not fully worked out in this chapter but they are interesting and stimulating. The other chapters on loyalty, power, and tolerance exemplify the two virtues which the book as a whole possesses. On the one hand they contain a careful analysis of the concepts involved, and on the other hand they represent a successful attempt to relate the analysis to current political problems.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this Eddington Memorial lecture, Von Wright distinguishes two points of view from which a logician may study time. The one focuses interest on the order of temporal events and the macro-aspect of time, its flow from an indefinitely remote past through the present to an indefinitely remote future. The other focuses attention on the micro-aspect of time, the nature of the time medium, on questions of whether time is discrete or infinitely divisible or the internal structure of limited time (...) intervals. Von Wright takes the second point of view and as a result his study of time is different in some respects than that of other contemporary tense logicians. Assuming a Tractatus type ontology of possible worlds which can be totally described by stating the existence or non-existence of all possible states of affairs, Von Wright constructs several logical systems, one of discrete time ordering, another of discrete time division. He shows the latter, which is the most important for his purposes, to be formally related to certain systems of modal logic. An interpretation of this system yields an interesting definition of continuity of change and time. The definition is interesting because of its relation to another result which he derives, namely that this definition of continuity implies that the world sometimes will have to be described as being in two contradictory states at one time, a conclusion which he relates to Hegel's philosophy. This is an original and thought provoking essay.--R. H. K. (shrink)